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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

KURT JOSEPH SCHMITT,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990925-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for unlawful possession of
laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage in a
clandestine operation, a first degree felony, and for possession
of methamphetamine,, a second degree felony.

Utah Code Ann. §78-

2-2(3)(i) and (4) (1996) and § 78-2a-3(j) (1996) give this Court
jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Does defendant have a constitutional right to enforce a plea
offer?
Defendant's single appellate claim raises an issue of
constitutional law; therefore, the Court reviews the issue for
correctness with no deference to the trial court.
City

Corp.

v. Willden,

Cf.

Provo

768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989)

(constitutional challenges to statute are questions of law

reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial courts'
rulings).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000), 58-37d-4 (1998), and
58-3 7d-5 (Supp. 2000) are attached as addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of
laboratory equipment or supplies in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37d-4 (1996), enhanced to a first degree felony by Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 2000), and possession of methamphetamine,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8
(Supp. 2000) (R. 2-1).
A jury convicted defendant of both counts (R. 286-85).

The

trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory prison terms of
five years to life on the first degree felony and one to fifteen
years on the second degree felony (R. 311). The Court imposed no
fines (id.).
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court (R. 308) . The supreme court transferred the case
to this Court (R. 319).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts underlying the criminal charges have no relevance
to the single appellate issue.

The State summarizes only the

procedural facts related to petitioner's single constitutional

2

claim.
On August 27, 1999, the Friday before the Monday, August 30,
1999, trial date, defendant filed a motion to enforce a plea
agreement and supporting memorandum and affidavits (R. 226-15).l
On the morning of the August 30 trial, the trial court heard
argument, direct testimony proffers (which the parties agreed to
accept in lieu of sworn testimony from defense and State's
counsel), and sworn cross-examination of State's counsel
concerning the motion to enforce the plea agreement (R. 292-92;
321 at 9-24).

Pages 9-24 from the trial transcript are attached

as addendum B.
Defendant's counsel proffered that, in April 1999, shortly
after he filed his motion to suppress evidence, the prosecutor
offered a plea bargain to defendant and co-defendant Robert Shell
(R. 321 at 9).

(Defendant's counsel represented both.)

According to counsel, defendant did not want to take the plea at
first (id. at 10). However, after discussions lasting "probably
upwards of an hour," counsel obtained defendant's agreement to
accept the prosecutor's offer (id. at 10).
Counsel proffered that, immediately after he met with
defendant, he called the prosecutor on his cell phone and told

r

Even though the Court held multiple scheduling conferences
and hearings in this case prior to trial, the record contains no
mention of a plea agreement in any proceeding prior to the August
27, 1999, motion (R. 53, 64, 108, 148-47, 154, 117).
3

the prosecutor that he had been "raked over the coals by [his]
client but [defendant] has agreed to the settlement offer" (id.).
Counsel suggested that the prosecutor prepare a written plea
agreement (id.) .
According to defense counsel, the matter "more or less got
dropped" while defendant focused on the suppression motion (id.
at 10-11).

Counsel proffered that, during a June 7, 1999,

suppression hearing, he attempted to "take care" of Shell's plea,
but the Court considered the proffered guilty plea premature
until it ruled on the suppression motion (id. at 11). Counsel
also proffered that, at the June 7 hearing, he confirmed with the
prosecutor defendant's desire to accept the plea offer (id.).
After that hearing, the plea again "got lost in the shuffle"
(id.) .*
Counsel proffered that he visited defendant on August 13,
1999 (id.).

At that visit, defendant again confirmed he wanted

the plea agreement (id.).
The prosecutor's proffered direct testimony and sworn crossexamination contradicted defense counsel's version of the
negotiations. According to the prosecutor, he made an offer in
2

The trial court asked counsel whether he had a transcript
demonstrating Shell's attempt to plead guilty on June 7, 1999
(id. at 24). Counsel admitted he did not (id.). The trial court
reviewed the record before it and noted that it contained no
minutes from any hearing on June 7, 1999, and that the minutes of
the May 3, May 5, and June 14 hearings mentioned no attempted
plea by Shell (id. at 24-25) .
4

March 1999, and defendant rejected it (id. at 17-20) . He denied
having any telephone discussion in which defense counsel told him
that defense counsel had a "difficult time" with defendant about
the offer, but that defendant had ultimately accepted it (id. at
20).

Defense counsel contacted the prosecutor about the offer

after the trial court denied the suppression motion (id. at 17) .
The prosecutor responded that there was no offer on the table for
defendant to accept (id. at 17-18).3
In addition to his proffer, the prosecutor argued that
defendant had not filed the motion to enforce timely (R. 17) .
The trial court did not resolve the factual dispute (R. 26).
Instead, the court concluded that defendant had not met his
burden to establish that a plea agreement existed because the
"evidence was so equally balanced" (id. at 26).
In addition the trial court found the motion untimely (R.
25).

The court rejected defendant's argument that his motion to

enforce was tantamount to a motion challenging the court's
jurisdiction (id. at 25-26).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion

3

In support of his proffer, the prosecutor presented plea
documents dated March 30, 1999 (R. 249-41; R. 321 at 17, 20). He
testified on cross-examination that he never delivered the
documents to defense counsel because defendant rejected the offer
(R. 321 at 20). The prosecutor further proffered that the State
clearly believed no plea agreement existed because the State had
prepared for trial (id. at 23-24) .~~
5

that no plea agreement existed.

Defendant contends only that he

had a constitutional right to enforce the plea offer.
Controlling precedent dictates the opposite result.
In addition, the trial court found that defendant untimely
filed his motion to enforce the alleged plea agreement.
Defendant identifies no error in that conclusion.

The trial

court's rejection of the motion on timeliness grounds provides an
additional and independent basis to affirm.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT HAD NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ENFORCE A PLEA
AGREEMENT, LET ALONE AN UNACCEPTED PLEA OFFER;
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO
GRANT AN UNTIMELY MOTION TO ENFORCE THE ALLEGED
AGREEMENT
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's conclusion
that he did not sustain his burden of proving that a plea
agreement existed. • Appellant's Brief at 5.

Defendant contends

only that he had a reasonable expectation in the plea offer that
created a constitutional right to enforce it.4
4

Defendant cites both federal and state constitutional
provisions. However, he does not argue that the State
constitution provides him any greater protections in the plea
negotiation process than the federal. Therefore, defendant
presents no basis for a separate state constitutional analysis.
See, e.g., State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 489 (Utah 1988)
(holding in a capital case that "nominally" referring to state
constitutional arguments is insufficient to consider them on
their merits: "•[t]his Court will not engage in constructing
arguments out of whole cloth on behalf of defendants in capital
cases1") (citation omitted); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341,
1344 (Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the
defendant's state constitutional challenge because defendant
6

Controlling precedent establishes that defendant had no
constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement, let alone an
unaccepted offer.

In Mabry v. Johnson,

467 U.S. 504 (1984), the

United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to enforce a plea agreement until he has
actually pleaded guilty.

In Mabry, Johnson accepted a plea offer

extended by a state prosecutor.

Id.

at 505-506.

However, the

prosecutor responded that he had made a mistake and withdrew the
offer, proposing instead a less favorable one.

Id.

at 506.

In

federal habeas litigation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that "fairness'' precluded the prosecutor from withdrawing
the offer once Johnson accepted it. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed.

The Supreme Court

failed to provide any supporting legal analysis or authority).
Defendant also states in his brief that the State never did
anything to withdraw the offer, and that "it is undisputed that
Defendant believed that the offer continued to remain open at all
times." Appellant's Brief at 7. Defendant relies on these
assertions to support his argument that defendant formed
expectations in reasonable reliance on the State's plea offer.
Id.
Although the factual representations are technically
correct, the "reasonableness" of defendant's reliance and
expectations necessitates endorsing his version of the
negotiations, which the trial court declined to do. The
prosecutor proffered that he made a plea offer, which defendant
rejected. Defendant cannot "reasonably" form an expectation in a
plea offer that he has rejected.
In any event, the State's argument establishes that
defendant's expectations, reasonable or otherwise, lack any legal
significance.
7

held that a plea agreement "standing alone is without
constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory
agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does
not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally
protected interest.''

Id.

at 507-508. A plea entered pursuant to

a plea bargain is susceptible to constitutional challenge only if
a breach calls into question whether the defendant entered the
plea with full knowledge of its consequences.

Id.

at 508-11.

Defendant had even less than that which the United States
Supreme Court found without "constitutional significance" in
Mabry.

Defendant has not challenged the trial court's finding

that no plea agreement existed; he only claims a constitutional
right to enforce a plea offer.

If he had no constitutional right

to enforce a plea agreement that did not result in a plea, he
certainly had no right to enforce an offer that did not result in
a plea agreement.
Defendant does not cite Mabry.
on Cooper v.

United

States,

Instead, he relies heavily

594 F.2d 12 (4th cir. 1979),

abrogated by Mabry v. Johnson,

467 U.S. 504 (1984) to support his

claim that he had a constitutional right to enforce the plea
offer.

In Cooper,

the Fourth Circuit recognized a constitutional

right to enforce a plea offer under certain circumstances
embodied in "the right to fundamental fairness embraced within
substantive due process guarantees," and "less directly" in the
8

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Id.

at 18. However, as already established, the United States

Supreme Court found that no such constitutional right existed.
Consequently, Cooper is no longer good law to support the
proposition for which defendant cites it.
United

Plaster

v.

789 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986) (recognizing

States,

that Mabry overruled Cooper,
facts in

See also

but distinguishing Mabry from the

Plaster).

Defendant also suggests that State

v. Bero, 645 P.2d 44

(Utah 1982) recognizes the constitutional right he asked the
trial court to enforce. Appellant's Brief at 6-7.

However, Bero

stands for the opposite proposition: "a 'plea agreement' that was
never agreed upon need not be fulfilled."

Id.

at 46.

Bero agreed to plead guilty to possession with intent to
distribute.

The written plea agreement indicated that the State

would move to dismiss two other charges in exchange for the plea.
At the plea hearing, defense counsel represented that she
understood the agreement to include a promise not to forfeit
Bero's car.

The prosecutor represented that they had discussed

such a term during negotiations, but that it never became part of
the agreement.

Id.

The trial court in Bero found that the parties had reached
no meeting of the minds concerning the car. Nevertheless, the
trial court concluded that "equity and fairness" required the
9

State to return the car.

Id.

The supreme court unanimously reversed.

The supreme court

held that "both parties to a plea agreement should know that they
must approach the court having reached a firm

which does not become enforceable
Id.

until

proposed

approved by the

agreement

court."

at 47 (emphasis added).
In this case, defendant asked the trial court to do what the

supreme court reversed another trial court for doing: enforce a
plea offer that never became part of a plea agreement approved by
the court.

The trial court correctly declined defendant's

invitation.
Alternatively, the trial court correctly denied the motion
because defendant did not file it timely.5

That ruling provides

an independent basis for affirming the trial court's denial of
the motion.
On appeal, defendant challenges this ruling in a onesentence, footnote argument equating the motion to a motion
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction that may be filed at
any time. Appellant's Brief at 4 n.4, citing Utah R. Crim. P.
12(b)(1).

Defendant argues only that, if the court had granted

the motion, it would have lost jurisdiction over the case.
defendant misstates that the trial court "opined that
Defendant's motion may not have been timely." Appellant's Brief
at 4 (emphasis added). To the contrary, the trial court ruled,
"I agree with [the prosecutor] that the motion is not timely" (R.
321 at 25).
10

Defendant offers no analysis or support for this argument
that a motion to enforce a plea offer equates to a challenge to
the trial court's jurisdiction.

The Court may reject this

argument as inadequately briefed and affirm the trial court's
conclusion that defendant untimely filed his motion to enforce
the agreement.

Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9) (requiring appellant to

support his argument with citation to authorities).
In any event, the argument is meritless.
on Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(1).

Appellant relies

However, that rule only excludes

from the time limit in 12(b) jurisdictional defects in an
indictment or information.

Defendant claimed no jurisdictional

defect in the information.
Indeed, defendant raised no jurisdictional claim at all. To
the contrary, defendant asked the trial court to exercise its
jurisdiction to enforce an alleged plea agreement.

Defendant's

attempt to characterize the motion as a challenge to the trial
court's jurisdiction directly contradicts the relief he sought.

11

CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly rejected defendant's claim that he
had a constitutional right to enforce a plea offer.
Alternatively, the trial court correctly denied relief on the
independent alternative grounds that defendant did not file the
motion timely.

The Court should affirm defendant's conviction on

either or both grounds.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

^^J^p-^^-^ji
THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES

58-37-8

58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit
substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct
which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more
violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or
more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a position
of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent
conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(c) -Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection
(D(aXii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate
term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined
in Section 76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his
immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the
offense, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (D(aXiv) is guilty of a
first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term
of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or
execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not
eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place

58-37-8
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knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in
any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a
second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any
controlled substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2Xb)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription
or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
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(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark,
trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under
Subsection (4Kb) if the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the
grounds of any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater,
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (4Xa)(i) through (viii); or
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of
age, regardless of where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first
degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years
if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this
subsection would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution
of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for
probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4),
a person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred
was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class
B misdemeanor.
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by
law.
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(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law 0f
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law 0f
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that
the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance
or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and
supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate
scope of his employment.
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, S 8; 1972, ch. 22,
§ 1; 1977, ch. 29, § 8; 1979, ch. 12, * 5; 1985,
ch. 148, § 1; 1988, ch. 198, § 1; 1987, ch. 92,
§ 100; 1987, ch. 190, § 3; 1988, ch. 95, 3 1;
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1988, ch. 58, * 1; 1989, ch.
178, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, S 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1;
1990, ch. 181, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, S 2; 1990,
ch. 183, § 3; 1991, ch. 80, § 1; 1991, ch. 198,
§ 4; 1991, ch. 288, § 7; 1995, ch. 284, § 1;
1998, ch. 1, § 8; 1997, ch. 84, § 8; 1998, ch.
139, § 1; 1999, ch. 12, ft 1; 1999, ch. 303, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, deleted former
Subsection (6) which read: "Any person who
attempts or conspires to commit any offense
unlawful under this chapter is upon conviction
guilty of one degree less than the maximum

penalty prescribed for that offense," redesignating the other subsections accordingly.
The 1999 amendment by ch. 12, effective May
3,1999, substituted "in the immediate presence
o r for "with" in Subsection (4XaXx) and made
minor stylistic changes in Subsections (2) and
(4).
The 1999 amendment by ch. 303, effective
May 3, 1999, added Subsection (lXc), redesignating former Subsection (lXc) as (lXd), substituted "chapter" for "subsection" in Subsection (2XaXi), and made a minor stylistic
change.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Charging offense.
—Separate offenses.
Physician-patient privilege.
Possession.
—Constructive.
Sentencing.
—Enhancement for prior conviction.
Sufficiency of evidence.
—Constructive possession.
—Failure to marshal evidence.
Cited.

Charging offense.
—Separate offenaea.
Defendant's concurrent possession of marijuana paraphernalia and methamphetamine
satisfied the temporal requirement of the single
criminal episode statute but, because separate
statutory offenses were involved, the possession did not satisfy the "same criminal objective" requirement. State v. Keppler, 1999 UT
App 89, 976 P.2d 99.
Physician-patient privilege.
Section 58-37-6 creates an exception to the

CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT

58-37d-5

'Subsection 58-37-2(19) of the Utah Controlled
Substances Act" in Subsection (lXfXiii); and
added Subsection (2).

58-37d-4. Prohibited acts — Second degree felony.
(1) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally:
(a) possess a controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(b) possess laboratory equipment or supplies with the intent to engage
in a clandestine laboratory operation;
(c) sell, distribute, or otherwise supply a precursor chemical, laboratory
equipment, or laboratory supplies knowing or having reasonable cause to
believe it will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(d) evade recordkeeping provisions of Title 58, Chapter 37c, Controlled
Substances Precursor Act, or the regulations issued under that act,
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the material distributed or received will be used for a clandestine laboratory operation;
(e) conspire with or aid another to engage in a clandestine laboratory
operation;
(f) produce or manufacture, or possess with intent to produce or
manufacture a controlled or counterfeit substance except as authorized
under Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
(g) transport or convey a controlled or counterfeit substance with the
intent to distribute or to be distributed by the person transporting or
conveying the controlled or counterfeit substance or by any other person
regardless of whether the final destination for the distribution is within
this state or any other location.
(2) Aperson who violates any provision of Subsection (1) is guilty of a second
degree felony.
,B*»tory: C. IMS, 58*37d-4, enacted by L.
'HS, ch. 156, § 4; 1997, c h. 64,1 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amend*«*, effective May 5,1997, added Subsections

(IXf) and (g) and made stylistic changes accordingly.
Croat-Reference*. — Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

^ 7 d . 5 . Prohibited acts — First degree felony.
(1

) Aperson who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
Editions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
m
aterials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
coated a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
ei
*vironment;
(d)
intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
^thin 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
te) any phase of the clandestine laboratory operation or production or
JJ^ufacture of a controlled or counterfeit substance involved a person less
l
**n 18 years of age;

a
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58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony.
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(l)(a), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
conditions occurred in conjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a
specified controlled substance; or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
cocaine base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in
Subsections (IXa) through (f) of this section occurred in conjunction with the
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense.
History: C. IMS, 58-374-6, enacted by L.
1998, ch- 156, 9 5; 1997, ch. 64,1 12; 1998,
ch. 66, i 1; 2006, ch. 187,1 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or was
conducted in the presence o r after "involved* in
Subsection (lXe).
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1,2000,

deleted former Subsection (lXe), which concerned clandestine drug laboratory operations
involving or conducted in the presence of persons under 18. A similar provision was enacted
as Section 76-5-112.5.
Cross-References. - Sentencing for felo^^ §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
. , . . - .
Lesser included offenses,
Sufficiency of evidence,

controlled substance precursor as a lesser ineluded offense of operating a methampheta m i n # laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
gg, 939 p 2d 1065.

included o f l w m .
Because no special verdict form was used,
and because it was possible that the jury relied
upon Subsection 5£-37d-4(lXa) in reaching its
verdict, which includes all the elements for
conviction of possession of a controlled substance precursor, the defendant was entitled to
reversal of his conviction for possession of a

Sufficiency of evidence.
Where the defendant did not acknowledge,
let alone marshal, the evidence presented at
trial, but described onlyfragmentedportions of
the evidence, the Supreme Court declined to
consider his contention that the evidence was
insufficient for conviction. State v. Hopkins,
1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1065.

ADDENDUM B

MR. HOLM: Yes.

Thank you, Your Honor.

The

basis for my motion is set forth in the affidavits.
Those, I guess, constitute a proffer of our testimony
in this case.

If the court wishes, we can certainly

both be sworn, Mr. Schmitt and myself, to testify
regarding the circumstances surrounding the offer of
the plea.

In April of 1999, shortly after my filing a

motion to suppress the evidence, I had discussions
with Mr. Burns regarding a potential plea agreement
for not only Mr. Schmitt, but Mr. Shell and
Ms. LePoma, who I also represent and is not before the
court today.
That motion --or that plea agreement was to
the effect that Mr. Schmitt would plead guilty to an
amended information charging possession of a
clandestine drug lab, a second degree felony, that
being the charge without the enhancements that are
included under the code. And that he would be
entitled then to condition that plea upon his denial
of the motion to suppress which had been filed, or if
it was denied, and/or if it was denied, it's
affirmance on appeal.
I spoke with Mr. Schmitt.

I recall

specifically going to the jail, speaking with him and
spending substantial amount of time, probably upwards
9

1

I of an hour in discussing that plea offer with

2

Mr. Schmitt.

3

After extensive discussion, I got his agreement to

4

accept the offer.

5

the telephone to Mr. Burns after that meeting on my

6

cell phone and saying, I have just been raked over the

7

coals by my client but he has agreed to the settlement

8

offer, and suggested that he then prepare the

9

appropriate documents, a written plea agreement,

10

I remember specifically calling on

present to the court to do that.
THE COURT: Mr. Holm, let me interrupt you

11
12

He initially did not want to accept it.

briefly.

13

Mr. Burns, are you going to require that

14

Mr. Holm testify under oath so you can cross-examine

15

him?

16
17
18
19

MR. BURNS:

I'll accept a proffer as long as

it doesn't get too crazy.
THE COURT: I am assuming that what you are
doing now is proffering --

20

MR. HOLM:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HOLM: Some of it's already in this

23

affidavit.

24

this proffer.

25

Basically, yes.
All right.

But I have added some additional facts in

In any event, thereafter, there was some --

the macter, more or less, got dropped.
more on the motion to suppress.

We focused

I do recall that in

June the matter came up again with regard to
Mr. Shell. And, in fact, a written plea agreement was
prepared.

We were still in the midst of litigating

the motion to suppress.

I remember sitting in court

with both Mr. Shell and Mr. Schmitt here, and
explaining to the court that we wish to at least take
care of Mr. Shell's plea at that time.

The court

said, Well, while that motion is still pending, I am
not going to -- I don't want to take a plea.
it's premature.

I think

And but I did again confirm with

Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Burns on -- on or about that date.
I believe it was the 7th of June, that we were in
court, that Mr. Schmitt still desired to go forward
with the plea bargain that had been offered by the
State of Utah.

And then it again got lost in the

shuffle, so to speak.
I went and visited with my client on the 13th
of August.

And he advised me that he still very much

wanted to accept the plea bargain that had been
offered by the state.

I then called Mr. Burns on the

18th of August and was informed that he did not, no
longer wish to go forward with that plea agreement.
I believe that the state is compelled to go
ll

on with, one, the plea agreement, based on the case
law that I have cited in my memorandum; specifically,
the civil cases that allow for enforcement of
settlement agreements.
THE COURT: I have read the memorandum.
MR. HOLM: Okay.

Contracts.

And then, even

if there is not a "contract," an offer plus
acceptance, then the Cooper vs. United States case
gives some authority.

And also the Barrow case, at

least by analogy, gives some authority for the
proposition that even without an agreement if there is
a reasonable expectation on the part of the defendant
that the plea would be -- should be granted, even
though you don't have the zap, as my contracts
professor would call it, the actual contract; that
still, under -- even under those circumstances, the
plea agreement is enforceable.

And we would,

therefore, submit that the state has an obligation to
follow through with the plea agreement that was
offered with regard to Mr. Schmitt.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask a couple of
questions.

Is it your position that there was an

actual contract arrived at?
MR. HOLM: It is my position that there was
because, as I stated before, I spoke with Mr. Burns,
12

immediately after speaking with my client in April,
and advised him that my client had accepted the offer.
THE COURT: Has the existence, or at least
your perception that there was an existence of an
agreement, at all modified your approach to preparing
for this case?
MR. HOLM: Well, it has to a certain extent,
Your Honor.

And, in fact, that gets into our -- the

consolidation issue.

My position has been all along

that Mr. Schmitt wouldn't be going to trial and,
therefore, I could safely represent both defendants at
a -- in this case, because Mr. Schmitt would never
ultimately go to trial and, therefore, I could safely
represent the interests of Mr. Shell at a trial while
at the same time Mr. Schmitt would be accepting a plea
bargain and there wouldn't be a conflict of interest
in my representing both of them in further
proceedings.
THE COURT: That raises the next question:
If you are required to go to trial representing both
defendants, in your view, is there a conflict of
interest?
MR. HOLM: I believe there is, yeah.

I

believe there is a conflict of their factual positions
in the case.

The items were found in a master bedroom
13

and "master bathroom."

Admittedly, that's the only

bathroom in the trailer.

But it is immediately off

the master bedroom, which was occupied by Mr. Schmitt.
So my argument with regard to Mr. Shell is that it was
only constructive, at best, constructive possession,
and that the state's required to show constructive
possession because it's not in his immediate
possession; whereas, Mr. Shell may have a desire to
shift some of the blame to Mister -- or Mr. Schmitt
may have a desire to shift some of the blame to
Mr. Shell for items that were found in the bedroom and
bathroom -THE COURT: Okay.

Anything else?

MR. HOLM: With regard to the motion to
enforce the plea agreement, no, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Just to summarize, how many times
did you communicate to Mr. Burns that you had accepted
his offer?
MR. HOLM: I believe twice, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And those were once on the cell
phone?
MR. HOLM: Once on the cell phone in April.
And once when we were either -- either before or after
or on the same date that we were in court on
Mr. Shell's case.
14

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HOLM: June.

That was in June?
I believe it was the 7th.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BURNS:

Mr. Burns.

Thank you, Your Honor.

The first

thing I would like to say just as a general premise,
is that we are here today and this case has been
pending since October of 1998. And it's the state's
position that these defendants have been provided with
every constitutional right and protection at every
stage of these proceedings.

And there is no prejudice

for them to have a jury trial.
foremost.

That's first and

Counsel almost makes it sound like it's the

last thing you want to do is put on evidence and have
a trial.

That's one.
Two.

It upsets me greatly for counsel to

stand up here today and say that he may have a
potential conflict between Mr. Schmitt and Mr. Shell.
And the reason that it upsets me is because, at the
preliminary hearing stage, in front of Judge
Braithwaite, and counsel will recall, not only did I
ask the court to inquire of Mr. Holm, but ask that
each defendant from their own mouth waive any conflict
and state to the court that they wanted Mr. Holm to
represent both of them.
I haven't had a chance to check the minute
15

entries or the tape in this court, but it's my
recollection that Your Honor did the same thing, that
both of these defendants waived any claim or conflict
of Mr. Holm.

And it upsets me that at 4:50 p.m. on

the Friday before the jury trial on Monday, Mr. Holm
files a motion stating there may be some conflict. I
would say two things:

One, it is not timely.

I don't

think the court should even consider a motion filed at
11:59 before 12 o'clock trial, Friday at 4:50.
sounds like intentional sabotage.
the office.

Almost

I wasn't even in

I haven't even seen the motions until

this morning, which is the morning of trial.
Two.

It almost sounds like intentional error

or bad faith to go almost a year representing both of
these defendants and then at 4:50 p.m. on Friday
before a Monday trial file a motion to say I think I
have a conflict, I think they have defenses which are
conflicting.

The state's position is there are no

conflicting defenses.

The court's heard the evidence

through numerous suppression hearings and the state's
evidence, basically, is, we got information there was
a meth lab.
trailer.

Officers went there.

We went to a

Both of these defendants came out of the

trailer, and there was a meth lab and methamphetamine
in the trailer.
16

I guess they can both point the finger at
each other, but Mr. Holm chose not to do that at this
point.

So I believe that that is not timely and not

made in good faith.
With respect to the motion to enforce the
plea agreement, the state offered this defendant,
Mr. Schmitt, and this defendant, Mr. Shell, a plea
agreement.

Counsel can't be right saying that in

April he met with Mr. Schmitt and then called me and
told me to prepare the documents, because I have in
the file, in Mr. Schmitt's file, a plea agreement that
I signed dated March of 1999.
done that.

That's one.

Two.
defendants.

So he couldn't have

My position is, I ordered it to these

And their position was they wanted to see

how the suppression hearing went before they agreed to
any plea bargain or not. And after the plea bargain,
Mr. Holms called me again -- after the suppression
hearing, when the court ruled that the evidence ought
not be suppressed, Mr. Holm called me again and I
said, I am sick of it. We have had motion after
motion.

This case has been pending almost a year.

There are no offers on the table, I am not prepared at
this time to go forward with the offer.

Your clients

didn't sign it, didn't accept it, and there are no
17

more offers.
So my position is, I made an offer to
Mr. Holm.

His clients didn't accept it. And now on,

again, on the eve of trial, here we are the day of
trial, now they want to enforce the plea agreement.
And my position is it's not timely.
With respect to the final motion, our motion
to consolidate -THE COURT: We are only talking about the
motion to enforce the plea agreement.
a couple of quick questions.

Let me ask you

So I take it from what

you just said, that that would be your testimony if
you were called to testify.
MR. BURNS:

Yes.

If I were called to

testify, I made the offer, counsel didn't respond to
me after the suppression hearing.

He said he wanted

it, and I said, Too late.
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Holm, are you

willing to accept that proffer of evidence?
MR. HOLM: I am willing to accept -- I am
willing to accept and stipulate that there were some
discussions in March of 1999. And I don't dispute
that a plea agreement was prepared.
it.

I have never seen

But I don't dispute that.
THE COURT: Well, the question is whether you
18

accept Mr. Burns' proffer of what his testimony would
•

be?
Yes.

MR. HOLM:
THE

All right,

COURT:

Do either of you wish

to cross-examine the other on your proffer?
i'M'JV,

No, Your Honor.

BURNS:

Mr. Holm?

THE COURT:
MR,

Yes.

H GIN.:

I guess to make the record

clear, I better -- I hate to do that, but I better
cross- examine.
All right. Mr. Burns, will you

THE COURT:

come up and take the oath, please.
SCOTT BURNS,
ca J 3 eel by P] an rti ff, having been duly
sworn, was examined and testifies as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
\BY

MR. HOLM:

Bur ns,

state your name.

Q

Mr

A

Scott Burns

Q

And

A

Cedar City.

Q

You are t. lined!" 1,or nf;""y for t he p 1 a int.iff,

w h e r e di )

"/UU

I I 76?

State

of Utah in this case?
A

Yes

Q

Are you - - you state that you made a proposal
19

for a plea agreement in March of 1999; is that
correct?
A

Yes.

Q

You have a copy of that plea agreement?

A

I do.

0

For Mr. Schmitt, yes.

Are you talking about Mr. Schmitt?

THE CLERK:

State's?

MR. HOLM: Yes. No.

Let's make that a

defense exhibit.
THE COURT: This will be a separate set of
exhibits from the trial exhibits.
BY MR. HOLM:

Q

Showing you Exhibits D-l and D-2, did you have

your office prepare those documents?
A

I did.

Q

They appear to be originals.

Were they ever

delivered to counsel, do you know?
A

No, they were not.

0

Do you deny having a telephone conference with

me where I disclosed to you that I had spoken with my
client, and after some difficulty had got his
agreement to a plea agreement?
A

I deny that.

In fact, my recollection is your

client did not want to accept my offer.

And based

upon that, I didn't forward to you copies.

I didn't
20

forward to you the originals for signing.

\

I kept them

i

in my file.
MR. HOLM:

Okay.

No further questions, Your

1

Honor.
THE COURT:
m^

HOLM:

THE COURT:
MR.

HOLM :

Okay.
Offer Exhibi t:s 1 ai i< I 2.
Those are what?
Proposed plea agreement:

and

ai i

amended information
THE COURT:

Any objection?

MR,

No, Your Honor.

BURNS:

THE COURT:

this motion,

of
I'll receive them for purposes
j

Yoi 1 may step down, Mr Bairns

(Defendant s Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2
were received into evidence.)
THE COURT:

^ i

r ight.

Any other <evidence on

the sub:lect of th'i s motion to enforce the plea
agreement?
MR,

HOLM:

Yes.

1 should probably call my

client, Mr. Schmitt
MR

BURNS:

I'] 1 accept a proffer, Your

Honor, :in the interest of time.
THE COURT:

MR. HOLM:

I assume this proffer

--

Proffer would be in the nature of

the affidavit, Your Honor.
21

THE COURT: All right.

I'll accept that

proffer, Mr. Burns, having consented to that.
MR. BURNS:

No objection.

THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Holm?
MR. HOLM: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. BURNS:

Mr. Burns, anything more?

No, sir.

THE COURT: Do either wish to argue it?
MR. HOLM: Well, yes, I do wish to add some
additional comment with regard to Mr. Burns' argument.
With regard to timeliness, if you look at Rule 12,
Rule 12(b)(1) states, defenses and objections based
on -- ordinarily you are required to file a motion
within five days prior to trial.

But there is an

exception with regard to defenses and objections based
on defects in the indictment and information.

Other

than that, it fails to show jurisdiction in the court
or charge an offense.

Okay.

Well, I would -- the

argument here is that this court doesn't have
jurisdiction over Mr. Schmitt on a first degree felony
and a second degree felony because of the plea
agreement.

And so, therefore, the timeliness of it is

not an issue.

It's -- I guess it would be similar to

a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction which can be brought at any time before
22

the court.
With regard to the issue of separate trials,
I want to read to you from the transcript of the
preliminary hearing, Your Honor.

And thar

- page 50.

THE COURT: We haven't really got to the
issue of separate trials yet, Mr. Holm.

Al though it's

been mentioned, I have been considering the evidence
presented - - o r the comments presented here as related
to the motion to enforce.
MR. HOLM: All right.

I will cover that

issue then when we get to that motion, if we do.
THE COURT: Anything el se?
MR. HOLM: Nothing further
THE COURT: Okay.
MR

BURNS:

Your Honor.

Mr. Burns.

Just briefly, Your Honor.

I

would argue to the court, after 13 years of doi ng
this, my practice is tha*" there is a plea agreement,
if there is a meeting ui uiie minds, i f thei e i s a
contract, i t sure happens before the day of trial
p ^ ^ iti a clear that the state did not believe that any
plea agreement had been effected by and between any of
these parties because we have been preparing for trial
for the last week

And we are here and prepared to go

forward to trial, which would be consistent with what
actually occurred, and til **- i *

*-bey didn't want a
23

plea agreement.
hearing.

They wanted to have a suppression

And here we are on the date of trial.

The

only support at all that there was a plea agreement
that was enforceable was a motion filed at 4:50 p.m.
on Friday.

We'll submit it.

THE COURT: A thought just occurred to me, do
you have any transcript from June 7th or any clerk's
minutes to support your contention that you offered to
plead to Mr. Shell guilty at that time, the court
wouldn't take the plea?
MR. HOLM: I don't have a transcript of the
proceedings on June 7th, no, Your Honor.

Yeah, maybe

there is something in the minutes, I don't know.
Haven't looked at those, either.
THE COURT: You said that happened on
June 7th?
MR. HOLM: I believe that's the date.

I may

be inaccurate.
THE COURT: Was it the day of the suppression
hearing?
MR. HOLM: Well, we had several continued
dates.

One of them, I believe, was the 7th.

the 14th.

It may have been in May.

One was

I'm not -- I

could be -- my clients believe it was in June.
THE COURT: Well, I just looked at the
24

